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This paper presents an inventory management policy for a retailer offering a layaway program. Layaway is
a service provided by retailers that allows budget constrained consumers who have sufficiently high valuations
to pay for a product in several installments rather than at once and obtain the product that has been
reserved for them at the end of the payment period. If a consumer defaults on payments, then the reserved
item is released back into store inventory. In this paper, we first determine the retailer’s optimal order
decisions when layaway is offered. We find that the order quantity under a layaway program decreases with
the likelihood of consumers not finishing their layaway plans and that it is not always profitable for a retailer
to offer a layaway program. We then identify the market conditions under which the retailer would benefit
from a layaway program. Lastly, we consider an extension to capture the influence of the timing of consumer
defaults.
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1. Introduction
A layaway program allows lower budget consumers who have sufficiently high valuations to pay for
a product in several installments rather than at once and obtain the product that has been reserved
for them at the end of the payment period. In terms of the product categories served, layaways are
often associated with the purchase of durable goods, such as home appliances, consumer electronics,
and furniture. Studying the range of financial services for low and moderate income families in the
Detroit area, Barr (2009) found that, among a sample of ‘unbanked’ households (i.e., no one in
the household has a checking/savings account or access to credit), 21.9% use layaway. According
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), in 2009, 7.7% of all households in the US
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were unbanked and 7% remained to do so in 2015 ( FDIC (2009, 2015). Further, and more recently,
a study by Deloitte found that 14% of surveyed US holiday shoppers in 2016 indicated that they
planned on taking advantage of layaway. These figures suggest a potentially sizable layaway market
in the US.
From a consumer’s perspective: when a consumer decides to put an item on layaway, he must
first pay a small program fee along with a down payment, which is the greater of a percentage of
the purchase price and a flat fee (Walmart 2017, K-Mart 2017, Sears 2017). The consumer then
makes equal payments of the remaining price during the payment period (e.g., weekly payments
over an eight-week period, though some retailers may also offer a longer payment duration). If
the consumer fails to make the agreed payments or informs the retailer that he would like to no
longer participate in the layaway program, then the consumer pays the retailer a cancellation fee
and receives all of the money he has paid the retailer towards the item so far. From the retailer’s
perspective: once an item is put on layaway, the retailer removes the item from the sales floor and
it is held for the consumer until all payments are made. In the case that the consumer defaults,
or chooses to no longer participate in the layaway program, the item is released back to inventory.
In a layaway setting, even though a retailer initially stocks out of items, due to layaway defaults
excess stock may still remain at the end of the sale period.
Layaway enables more consumers to purchase an item, however, a retailer exposes themselves
to consumer defaults due to layaway purchases. According to Rob Oglesby (2012), on average up
to 25% of layaway orders are cancelled. This means that stock that was committed to being sold
via layaway, may suddenly become available again. For durable goods that have multiple versions,
such as the latest mobile phone, losing the opportunity to sell an item for up to two months may
mean that the price for the newly released item may be lower than when it was initially put on
layaway, resulting in opportunity costs for the retailer. Given that potentially more consumers can
now purchase items via a layaway program, but that there is a chance that some consumers may
not complete paying for the item, the following question arises: “How does offering layaway impact
the inventory decisions of a retailer?”
With this paper, we are taking the first step needed to study ordering decisions in the presence
of layaway programs, through which budget constrained individuals that may not be able to afford
purchasing through a single payment receive the product after paying through multiple smaller
installments. To help retailers such as Walmart, Sears, and K-Mart who are actively providing
layaway as a service, we characterize the impact of layaway on a retailer’s order quantities and
investigate conditions under which it is beneficial for a retailer to offer layaway.
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To do so, we first propose a model of consumer behavior for a retailer offering layaway and then
construct a condensed single period model in a newsvendor framework that captures essential fea-
tures of and trade-offs in layaway operations. Through the framework, we characterize a retailer’s
optimal order quantity decision when offering layaway and provide insights on how the optimal
ordering decision is influenced by key market parameters such as consumers’ default rates, valu-
ations, and budgets; program characteristics such as service and cancellation fees; and retailer’s
cost structure regarding the salvage, shortage, and purchase costs. Further, we also identify market
conditions under which it is optimal for a retailer to offer layaway in the first place. Specifically, we
find that there is a critical market default rate below which the firm benefits from offering layaway
and above which the firm is better off not offering layaway. We also investigate how this critical
default rate changes with other problem parameters. Lastly, we extend the model to a two-period
setting to capture the influence of the timing of consumer defaults.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner: In Section 2, we discuss the
related work to that presented here. In Section 3, we formalize our model of a firm offering layaway.
We present the optimal ordering decisions by the retailer in Section 4 and further investigate the
conditions that are conducive to a viable layaway program in Section 5. We consider an extension
to our main model to a two-period setting in Section 6 and conclude our paper in Section 7.
2. Related Work
To our knowledge, there is no prior work in operations management that considers the impact of
layaway on a retailer’s ordering decisions. However, the main set of literature that we are aware
of in operations management related to our work is that in returns. In addition to the work on
returns, another two streams of literature on renting and rent-to-own is also related to our work. In
the remainder of the section, we first discuss the rental and rent-to-own literature then we discuss
the returns stream in the literature.
Operations management issues in the rental and rent-to-own industry are studied in the academic
literature. The work of Whisler (1967) determines the volume of inventory to hold for rental
equipment using a dynamic programming model. Anderson and Sibdari (2012) study the dynamic
ordering decisions of a firm offering a rent-to-own product, where the firm balances lost rental
opportunities from low inventories with potential excessive inventory due to returns by consumers.
Schultz (1986) also considers the inventory policies of a rent-to-own business through a queueing
model. The main difference between the work in rental and rent-to-own inventory decisions is that,
as noted by Schultz (1986), most rent-to-own items are expected to be returned, the opposite of
layaway items.
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Retailing returns is more closely related to the problem considered in this paper. In the returns
literature, consumers buy goods and after experiencing the good, may decide to return the good
back to the retailer. Once a customer returns a product, a retailer usually uses its reverse logistics
policies to best deal with the returned product (Meyer 1999). For example, if the product is still
functional, then the product may be repackaged and resold through the same channel. However,
in cases where the product needs to be remanufactured/refurbished, the resulting product is usu-
ally sold through channels other than where the original product was procured at a lower price,
sometimes only recouping 20% the original retail price (Meyer 1999). The one thing that all of the
returns handling methods share is that they all are costly to the retailer. This cost may be passed
down to customers via a percentage of the retail price, restocking fees, but these fees only cover
part of the return cost (Meyer 1999). Unlike returns, layaways have no post layaway costs, nor
do layaways require new supply chain partners to handle reverse logistics via centralized return
centers. The only cost layaways present to a retailer is opportunity cost, in the case a retailer stocks
out of non-layaway products before a layaway customer defaults on his/her payment plan.
We now consider some of the recent operations management work in consumer returns. One set
of papers on consumer returns considers money-back guarantees or very lenient (very small fees for
returning items) return policies in retailing. Pinc¸e et al. (2016), Yang et al. (2017), Li et al. (2012),
Chen and Chen (2016) consider various aspect of consumer returns, from optimal pricing and order
quantities to selecting clearing channels for returned goods, some even considering competition
from other retailers. The main difference between the papers in retail return policies and that
presented here is that in our paper, not all consumers are allowed to return an item. Note that
returning an item, in our model, is similar to defaulting on the layaway item. In fact, one may think
of layaway, with respect to the returns literature, as a return policy in which a consumer must pay
a flat fee for the option to return the product later. The set of papers by Chen and Bell (2011,
2009) also consider the impact of consumer returns on a retailer and a retailing supply chain. The
authors show that prices may increase and order quantity may decrease when consumer returns
increase with number of units sold.
The introduction of returns results in an increase in the demand for products as consumer valua-
tion uncertainty is alleviated. Valuation uncertainty is used to describe the idea that consumers do
not know their true value of a product until they have a chance to experience the product. Various
researchers argue that offering returns increases the market size for a product when consumers
have valuation uncertainty by giving such consumers the option of partially, or fully, recouping
their purchase costs (Akc¸ay et al. 2013, Yang et al. 2017, Altug and Aydinliyim 2016, Su 2009). In
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our paper we do not consider valuation uncertainty, we assume that each consumer will value the
product the amount each initially prescribes to the product. However, market size still expands
in our model when layaway is offered because we consider budget constrained individuals making
purchasing decisions. Layaway allows individuals that would normally not be able to purchase a
product outright, to amortize the cost of the product over time, and thus eventually purchase
the product. Though we have not seen these terms in the literature, one may argue that work
in valuation uncertainty considers valuation market size expansion, while in our paper we con-
sider budgetary market size expansion. This is further reflected by the fact that as shown in the
literature, allowing for returns results in a higher retail price (Che 1996). We show that even if
price is exogenously set, there may be a net positive benefit for a retailer to offer layaways. (We
also note that some of this work, e.g., Altug and Aydinliyim (2016) uses a newsvendor model to
determine inventory decisions, the literature in utilizing newsvendor models for inventory decisions
is substantial and some recent papers in retail operations include Ma et al. (2017), Sarkar et al.
(2018), Abdel-Aal et al. (2017).)
To summarize, even though there are similarities between layaways and returns in terms of
opportunity cost of sales that arises from defaulted layaways or returned items, a key distinguishing
feature common to layaway programs is the additional low-budget market segment such programs
can serve. Specifically, the product return literature generally addresses valuation uncertainty and
does not segment the market in terms of consumers’ ability to pay as the returns setting requires
that a customer has the initial capability to purchase the product if their net utility is positive.
On the other hand, the layaway setting particularly allows the study of the benefits and costs of
extending the market to consumers with lower income.
3. The Model
A layaway program is characterized by: (i) the length of the layaway period, L, during which a
layaway consumer pays for a product with price r in equal installments of r/L, (ii) an initial
enrollment fee fs for participation in the program, and (iii) a cancellation fee fc if the consumer
terminates the program before payment completion. To help in reading the model and results, we
include a list of the notation used in this paper in Appendix A. We assume that a consumer’s
budget, b, is available each of the L periods, something akin to a salary. We also assume that
fs ≤ r and fc ≤ r, i.e., the program fees are less than the price of the product. In addition, for
tractability purposes, we condense all L layaway periods into a single period. A single period
model is equivalent to a multi-period model with a single ordering epoch, during the first period
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of the planning horizon, and consumer defaults only occur at the end of the last period of the
planning horizon, meaning that returns from layaways are not sold later in the market. We provide
extensions to our model in Section 6 where some layaway defaults may be used to satisfy later
arriving immediate purchase demand.
Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations for the product as well as their available budget
for payment. A consumer with valuation v immediately purchases the product only if their valuation
exceeds the product price, i.e., v > r, and if their budget is sufficient for purchase, i.e., b≥ r. If a
consumer’s budget is insufficient for an immediate purchase, i.e., b < r, they can still obtain the
product through the layaway program provided that their budget is adequate for each installment
payment, i.e., b≥ r/L, and that their discounted valuation is greater than the product price and the
layaway participation fee, i.e., θv > r+fs, where θ < 1 is a discount factor that reflects the disutility
from waiting to obtain the product at the end of the layaway period. Note that any consumer with
adequate budget prefers to purchase the product immediately rather than through the layaway
program. For tractability, we assume that consumer valuations and budgets are independently
and uniformly distributed between [0,2v¯] and [0,2b¯], respectively. (As a side note, microeconomic
theory predicts consumers may have higher willingness to pay when their income increases, see for
example Ferber (1962). On the other hand, there is also evidence that consumer budgeting and
categorization of expenses results in deviations from predictions, resulting in over consumption of
some categories while reducing consumption in others, see for example, Heaths and Soll (1996).
Consequently, our assumption on the independence of budgets and willingness to pay are also
supported by works such as Flores and Carson (1997).)
Letting pI denote the probability that a consumer purchases the product immediately, we have
pI =
(
1− r
2v¯
) (
1− r
2b¯
)
, where the first and second terms correspond respectively, to the probability
that a consumer’s valuation and their budget exceeds the product’s price. Similarly, the probability
that a consumer purchases the product through the layaway program, pL, can be expressed as
pL =
(
1− r+fs
2v¯θ
) (
r
2b¯
) (
L−1
L
)
, where the first term is the probability that a consumer’s discounted
valuation exceeds the product price plus the service fee, and the remaining terms represent the
probability that the consumer’s budget is inadequate for an immediate purchase but is sufficient
for the layaway program. We assume v¯ and b¯ are sufficiently large such that both segments of the
market exist. We let the total market size, denoted by D, to be random with cumulative distribution
F (·) that we assume to be invertible. Using D, we can express the demand for immediate sales and
for layaway sales as pID and pLD, respectively.
The firm makes a single order quantity decision, Q, that is used to satisfy both types of demand
across its sales horizon. Whereas an immediately purchased product leaves the firm’s inventory
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at the time of purchase, a product purchased through the layaway program remains in the firm’s
possession until all payments have been received. The presence of layaway means that previously
reserved inventory may be released back onto the sales floor whenever a consumer defaults on a
layaway plan. We denote the market default rate with δ, where δ < 1. When a consumer defaults,
the firm charges the consumer a cancellation fee fc in addition to keeping the layaway service
fee, fs, and returns all other payments the consumer has made up to that point in time. If the
firm’s initial inventory is sufficient to satisfy both types of demand completely, then any remaining
inventory, excess or released back due to layaway defaults is salvaged. Our model allows for units
to be salvaged either for a profit or at a cost. If the firm’s inventory cannot meet all demand,
then the firm satisfies the demand proportionally (e.g., on a first come first served basis) assuming
that it cannot prioritize either type of consumer. In such an instance, it receives the sales revenue
including any layaway fees and incurs a lost sales penalty.
It is important to note that even if the firm cannot initially meet all demand, it may still need to
salvage units at the end of the period due to any layaway defaults. Thus, even though the layaway
program captures a new market segment and does not impact the size of the regular demand, it
may cannibalize regular product sales and force the firm to miss sales and salvage a product due
to consumer defaults.
We formulate the problem by first expressing the firm’s profit for any given quantity, Q, and
demand realization, D, denoted by pˆiL(Q,D), and as stated below:
pˆiL(Q,D) =

pI ·D · r+ pL ·D (fs + δ · fc + (1− δ) · r) if (pI + pL) ·D≤Q
− (Q+ pLδD− (pI + pL) ·D) · s− cQ
pI
pI+pL
· r ·Q+ pL
pI+pL
·Q (fs + δ · fc + (1− δ) · r) if (pI + pL) ·D>Q
− ((pI + pL) ·D−Q) · u− pLpL+pI δQs− cQ
(1)
In (1), the first case where (pI + pL) ·D≤Q corresponds to firm’s profit if its available quantity
can meet all demand. The term pI ·D · r is the revenue obtained through immediate sales and the
term pL ·D (fs + δ · fc + (1− δ) · r) corresponds to revenue generated through the layaway program.
Specifically, in addition to the program participation fee, fs, the firm receives only an additional
cancellation fee fc if a consumer defaults, and receives the full price of the product if a consumer
completes full payment. The term (Q+ pLδD − (pI + pL) ·D) · s corresponds to the cost due to
or revenue from salvaged units. The s term captures the net salvage cost after accounting for any
holding costs of the units, we assume that the holding cost is the same for layaway and non-layaway
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items. If the salvage cost is positive (s> 0), then one may interpret the salvage cost as the cost of
scrapping/recycling one unit of the product. However, if the salvage cost is negative (s< 0) then
one may interpret the salvage cost as a discounted sales price. The last term is the purchase cost,
where c denotes the unit purchase cost for the product.
If, on the other hand the firm’s quantity is not sufficient to meet all demand, i.e., (pI+pL) ·D>Q,
then the firm satisfies the demand proportionally as much as its inventory, Q, allows as the first two
terms in the corresponding expression denotes. The term ((pI +pL) ·D−Q) ·u is the cost incurred
due to missed sales, where u denotes the per unit missed sale penalty (shortage cost). Finally,
pL
pL+pI
δQs is the salvage revenue/cost for unsold units and the last term indicates the ordering cost.
Overall, the firm’s objective is to set a quantity decision, Q, that maximizes its expected
profit, with respect to a general demand distribution f(·), piL(Q), i.e., max
Q
piL(Q) where piL(Q) =
ED∼f(·)[pˆiL(Q,D)]. In the following sections, we study the firm’s optimal quantity decision taking
into account layaways and investigate when it is beneficial for the firm to offer layaways.
4. Layaway Order Quantities
In the previous section we present the profit of a retailer that offers layaway. Using the derived
profit function (1), in this section we determine the optimal order quantity of the retailer. We now
present the optimal order quantity of the retailer when layaway is offered to consumers.
To start we write piL(Q):
piL(Q) =
∫ Q/(pI+pL)
0
[
(pI · r+ pL · (δ(fs + fc) + (1− δ)(fs + r)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
r′
·x
− s(Q− (pI + pL)x+ pLδx)
]
f(x)dx
+
∫ ∞
Q/(pI+pL)
( pIpI + pL · r+ pLpI + pL · (δ(fs + fc) + (1− δ)(fs + r))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
r′′
Q
− pL
pL+pI
δQs− u((pI + pL)x−Q)
]
f(x)dx
−cQ
(2)
In (2), the first term in the sum corresponds to the case where the firm’s order exceeds total demand
from sales and layaways, i.e., Q> (pI +pL) ·D. The second term in the sum is the expected profit if
fewer items were ordered than demanded by the market. For convenience, we introduce the terms
r′ ≡ pI · r+ pL · (δ(fs + fc) + (1− δ)(fs + r)) and r′′ ≡ pIpI+pL · r+
pL
pI+pL
· (δ(fs + fc) + (1− δ)(fs + r))
to capture the effective retail price of the sold goods taking into account the market segmentation
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(layaway purchasers and non-layaway purchasers) and defaults. The third and last term, in the
sum, is the retailer’s order cost.
We find Q∗L by solving for Q in the first order conditions of piL(Q).
Proposition 1. The optimal order quantity of a retailer facing a general demand distribution,
with cumulative distribution function F (·), while offering layaway is:
Q∗L = (pI + pL)F
−1
(
r′′− pL
pI+pL
δs+ u− c
r′′− pL
pI+pL
δs+ u+ s
)
. (3)
where r′′ = pI
pI+pL
· r+ pL
pI+pL
· (δ(fs + fc) + (1− δ)(fs + r)).
Proof: The derivation of all results are presented in Appendix B.
In the critical fractile presented in (3), the cost of underage is given by r′′ − pL
pI+pL
δs + u− c,
whereas the cost of overage is s + c. Specifically, the term r′′ in the cost of underage expression
corresponds to the lost effective revenue as defined earlier. The term pL
pI+pL
δs is an adjustment to
incorporate the salvage revenue/cost where pL
pI+pL
δ is the probability that the unit would have been
sold as a layaway and defaulted, and s is the unit salvage revenue if s< 0 or salvage cost if s> 0.
The terms u and c refer to the unit shortage cost and the ordering cost for the item, respectively.
Similarly, the cost of overage terms s and c collectively account for the salvage/cost and ordering
cost of an excess unit of product. Lastly, we note that the firm orders a fraction (pI + pL) of the
fractile of the overall demand it chooses to serve.
We next show how the optimal order quantity decision under layaways, Q∗L, changes with various
exogenous parameters. For most parameters, we simply look at the partial derivative of Q∗L with
respect to that parameter in our sensitivity analysis. We now present the sensitivity of Q∗L with
respect to some parameters, while still assuming a general demand distribution.
Proposition 2. Q∗L increases with u and fc, and decreases with δ, s, and c.
The proof of Proposition 2 is found in Appendix B. We summarize the results of Proposition 2
in Table 1.
For the remaining parameters that influence the values of pI and pL (θ, b¯, v¯, r, fs,L) we find that
there is no clear relationship when we consider a general demand distribution function. Only after
we assume a particular functional form of the demand distribution, uniform, are we able to find
that for all parameters, except for L, Q∗L is stationary for only one point. After exploring these
relationships numerically, we see that Q∗L is increasing initially and decreasing thereafter for r and
fs, this is discussed in greater detail in Appendix C. For example, we see that as r increases, while
all other parameters remain constant, Q∗L(r) initially increases and then decreases. The reason
Dimitrov, Ceryan: Optimal Inventory Decisions when Offering Layaway
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Variable Impact on Q∗L
Cancellation fee, fc ↑
Default rate, δ ↓
Shortage cost, u ↑
Salvage cost, s ↓
Purchase cost, c ↓
Table 1 Comparative Statics on the Optimal Order Quantity in the Presence of Layaways (↑ indicates weakly
increasing, ↓ indicates weakly decreasing).
Q∗L(r) increases initially is because a low retail price does not compensate the retailer for the
loss of revenue due to layaway defaults, as such the retailer would rather have lost sales than
too much inventory (we explore the market size for layaway and immediate purchases in greater
detail in Appendix E). However, as price increases, the retailer is compensated by each successful
sale for each layaway consumer that defaults. As retail price continues to increase we note that
fewer consumers are able to afford the product, and as such the amount of products ordered also
decreases.
5. The Profitability of Layaways
Offering layaways allows the firm to extend the market it serves by capturing consumers who have
high valuation but low budget. However, as we have discussed previously, the benefits from these
additional sales may also be offset by losses due to consumer defaults resulting in additionally
ordered units to be salvaged at a lower price or at a cost. Thus, it is not immediately clear whether,
or under what conditions, it is profitable for the firm to offer layaways in the first place. Our goal
in this section is to provide further insights into this decision.
To do so, we first investigate how the firm’s expected profit changes with respect to the default
rate. We then contrast the firm’s expected profit with and without a layaway program to define
a critical default rate in the market characteristics that determines whether offering layaways is
profitable. For the remainder of this section we assume that fc ≤ r, that is, the cancellation fee the
consumer pays does not exceed the product’s purchase price, and that the salvage price does not
exceed r− fc.
Proposition 3. The firm’s optimal expected profit, pi, strictly decreases with the market default
rate δ.
The proof of Proposition 3 is provided in Appendix B. As stated in Proposition 3, the firm’s
expected profit decreases as the default probability among consumers who participate in the lay-
away program increases. As a result, and as we formally state in Proposition 4, offering layaways
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may actually hinder a firm’s profit compared to what the firm would have been able to achieve
without offering layaways. (Note: In Proposition 4, we assume that −s< u (applicable when s< 0).
This is a technical assumption required for the second order condition of the profit function when
no layaway is offered to be concave. Managerially speaking, the constraint guarantees that the
benefits of salvaging unsold goods is not so high that the retailer would prefer to order an infinite
number of goods even when layaway is not offered.)
Proposition 4. There exists δc ∈ [0,1], indicating a critical default rate, such that, it is prof-
itable to offer layaways if δ < δc and not to offer layaways otherwise.
The proof of Proposition 4 is provided in Appendix B. Proposition 4 indicates that there exists
a critical default rate, denoted by δc, above which a layaway program is not profitable for the
firm and below which, offering layaways improves the firm’s profitability. Specifically, although the
layaway market allows the firm to serve an additional (low budget) segment of the market without
cannibalizing the regular demand, this additional low budget segment may in fact reduce the firm’s
profitability when the default rate among these consumers are high due to the following: Serving
this segment of the market induces the firm to order a higher initial quantity and a higher default
rate results in a larger number of these units to be salvaged at the end of the period. Moreover, as
the firm serves the market in a first-come, first-served fashion, in instances when overall demand
is larger than firm’s inventory, the firm may miss regular sales and lose revenue even though they
may still end the period with on-hand inventory due to layaway defaults.
Next, we numerically explore how this critical default rate is influenced by exogenous parameters
assuming a uniform demand function. As depicted in Table 2, we find that the critical default rate
decreases with respect to the salvage cost s as well as the shortage cost u. In other words, the firm’s
willingness to offer layaways decreases when it is more costly to discard any unsold units or to face
shortages. If instead the firm is able to salvage unsold units not at a cost but at a reduced selling
price (represented by a negative s value), then the firm’s willingness to offer layaways increases as
Variable Impact on critical default rate, δc
Shortage cost, u ↓
Salvage cost, s ↓
Purchase cost, c ↓
Retail price, r ↑
Service fee, fs ↑
Cancellation fee, fc ↑
Table 2 Comparative statics on the critical default rate, δc .
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Offer Layaways
Do Not Offer Layaways
Figure 1 Profitability of Offering Layaways with respect to retail price and consumers’ budget
the salvage price increases (i.e., a more negative s value). The reason δc is decreasing in both u
and s follows from the fact that the layaway program increases the likelihood of both inventory
shortages and overages. In particular, an item put on layaway may not be sold to a consumer
wanting to immediately purchase the item, thus items on layaway may result in further shortages.
In addition, defaulted layaway items will be salvaged at the end of the planning horizon, again
leading to costs to the retailer. Therefore, as either u or s increase, the retailer would like to be
sure that items on layaway will likely not be defaulted on by participating consumers.
In addition, as shown in Table 2, we also find that layaways become less attractive when the
purchase cost of the product increases and more attractive when the product can be sold for a higher
margin. As the per-unit procurement cost c increases, layaway becomes less attractive because
the market margins are lower and the relative recuperated cost from salvaged items decreases.
Using similar logic, as the retail price, r, increases the relative recuperated cost from a successfully
sold item increases and layaway becomes more attractive. Finally, both the service fee and the
cancellation fee increases the firm’s willingness to offer a layaway program. Note that as fs increases,
the likelihood of someone participating in the layaway program tends to zero. We carried out the
above numerical analysis for a different demand distribution, lognormal demand, and qualitatively
observe the same relationships between δc and u, s, c, r, fs, and fc.
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In addition to the single parameter results summarized in Table 2, we also would like to particu-
larly comment on how the firm’s decision on whether to offer layaway is influenced by simultaneous
variations in the product’s price and consumers’ budget as these two parameters are among the
main ones that determine the relative sizes of the instantaneous purchase and layaway markets.
(As we mentioned earlier, a more detailed description on how the market sizes change with respect
to various parameters is provided in Appendix E.) In particular, Figure 1 displays the retailer’s
optimal market strategy regarding whether to offer a layaway (grey region in the figure) or not
(white region in the figure) with respect to the product price and budget parameters. Figure 1
shows that, for a given budget level, the firm may shift from not offering the product at all to
offering the product only for immediate purchase, and then to offering the product via both imme-
diate and layaway purchases as the retail price of the product gets larger. For a given retail price,
the firm may shift from offering the product through both layaway and immediate purchase to
only offering the product for immediate purchase as consumers’ budgets increase. For a very low
retail price, the firm may be better of by only offering the product through immediate purchase or
not offering the product at all. The latter results from most consumers purchasing the product at
higher budgets for which the order quantities along with stochastic demand results in a net loss
for the retailer due to the shortage and overage costs dominating the retailer’s profits from selling
items at a low retail price.
6. An Extension to a Two-Period Model
We also would like to provide a brief extension to a two-period model, in which the firm is able to
satisfy some late arriving immediate purchasers through units that become available due to early
defaults in the layaway program. Specifically, we consider the following sequence of events. At the
beginning of the first period, the firm places an order of size Q. While all customers interested
in the layaway program arrive in the first period, the immediate purchasers are split between two
periods, a fraction (1−α) arriving in the first period, and the remaining fraction α arriving in the
second period, where 0≤ α≤ 1. Among the layaway defaults, a fraction β (where 0≤ β ≤ 1) occurs
in the first period and the remaining fraction (1−β) occurs at the end of the second period. Any
defaulted units in the first period can be used to satisfy immediate purchase demand during the
second period. To aid the exposition and to draw parallels between our initial results, we account
for the salvage/holding cost and shortage cost in aggregate for the entire two-period horizon, i.e.,
holding/salvage is based on the remaining inventory at the end of the second period and shortage
corresponds to all missed demand by the end of the second period.
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In this extended model, α indicates the relative strength of separation between early arriving
layaway customers and late arriving immediate purchasers. For example, α= 1 indicates complete
separation, and that the two types of demand arrive sequentially. Likewise, β indicates the propor-
tion of defaulted units that can still be used to satisfy late arriving demand. For example, β = 1
implies all defaults in the layaway program can later be sold to late arriving immediate purchasers.
Consequently, the instance with α= 0 and β = 0 reduces the problem to our original formulation.
The model gives rise to two distinct cases based on the relative values of α and β. Apart from
having excess units or shortages during both periods that is common to both cases, the first
case corresponds to the possibility that the firm has excess inventory in the first period but faces
shortages in the second period, and the second case corresponds to the possibility that the firm
runs out of stock in the first period but is able to satisfy all demand in the second period (i.e.,
earlier defaults exceed late arriving demand). The two cases cannot both occur for a given set of
problem parameters. While the first case arises when pIα≥ pLδβ where δ corresponds to the overall
default rate as defined earlier, pIα < pLδβ implies the second case. As the analysis of both cases
are similar, and also follows similar steps as in our main model, for brevity, we omit the derivation
details and only provide the results for the more practical first case where the firm may have excess
inventory at the end of the first period but face shortages in the second period. (For brevity, we
relegate the description of the expected profit function to Appendix D.) Our main finding is as
follows.
Proposition 5. The optimal order quantity for the two-period model satisfies the following
expression:
(s+ r+ u) [(1−α)pI + pL]F
(
Q∗
pI+(1−δβ)pL
)
+ [pL(fs + δfc)− (r+ s)pLδ(1−β) + upLδβ]F
(
Q∗
(1−α)pI+pL
)
= (1−α)pIr+ pL(fs + δfc + (1− δ)r) + pLδβr+ u(1−α)pI
+ upL(1 + δβ)− spLδ(1−β)− c(1−α)pI − cpL
(4)
The proof of Proposition 5 follows the same procedure as Proposition 1 using the expected profit
function defined in Appendix D. The expression in (4) indicates that the optimal order quantity
relates the cumulative distribution function of demand at two different points, i.e., F
(
Q∗
pI+(1−δβ)pL
)
and F
(
Q∗
(1−α)pI+pL
)
. We note that, when α= 0 and β = 0, the two cumulative distribution functions
are evaluated at the same point, i.e., F
(
Q∗
pI+pL
)
, and the expression for the optimal order quantity
reduces to the result given in Proposition 1. This is expected since the two formulations become
equivalent in this case, as discussed previously.
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As in our main model, next we would like to comment on the sensitivity of the optimal order
quantity with respect to various problem parameters. Our numerical studies demonstrate that the
two-period model maintains the monotonicity results we have outlined in Table 1 and Table 3.
For example, the optimal order quantity increases in the shortage cost, and the upper bounds for
budget and valuations, and decreases in the default rate, salvage cost, and purchase cost. Regarding
the sensitivity to the retail price, we again observe that the optimal order quantity first increases
and then decreases with the retail price.
One might conjecture that as α or β increases, the optimal order quantity may decrease. The
rationale behind this conjecture is that as α increases, more of the immediate demand arrives late
and therefore can benefit from any defaulted layaway units earlier in the horizon. In a similar
fashion, an increase in β indicates that more of the defaults happen earlier in the horizon, thus
increasing the number of units available for the second period. Although we are not able to ana-
lytically prove the sensitivity of the optimal order quantity with respect to α and β, extensive
numerical tests suggest that the order quantity decreases with α and β, i.e., the firm orders less if
more of the immediate purchase demand arrives later in the horizon, or more of the defaults occur
earlier in the horizon.
Our formulation in this section did not allow for a subsequent ordering decision at the beginning
of the second period. We regard this extension beyond the scope of our current study. Nevertheless,
based on our findings, we would expect that an increase in α would cause the subsequent order
quantity to increase, while an increase in β would lower the subsequent order. That is, we would
expect that the second period order quantity would be higher as more of the instantaneous demand
arrives late and would be lower as more of the defaulted layaways are available to satisfy the
second period demand. However, we believe that a future study that considers layaways in a more
general multiple period setting through a dynamic programming formulation will provide further
important contributions to our understanding of the design and operation of layaway programs.
7. Conclusions
This paper discusses layaway programs offered by retailers to serve consumers with high valuations
but low budget. We first construct a consumer utility model that captures consumers’ heterogeneity
in terms of both valuations and budgets. Next, we formulate the firm’s quantity selection problem
and identify the optimal ordering policy in the presence of layaways. We study the sensitivity of
the optimal order quantity with respect to several problem parameters, in terms of (i) market
characteristics such as consumers’ default rates, valuations, and budgets, (ii) program character-
istics such as service and cancellation fees, and (iii) retailer’s cost structure regarding the salvage,
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shortage, and purchase costs. It is important to note that even though offering a layaway program
enables the firm to expand the proportion of the market it can serve, and thus generate additional
revenue, it also comes with risks arising from consumer defaults in terms of costly salvages and/or
potential missed regular sales. Our setting allows us to investigate when a firm would benefit from
a layaway program. Specifically, we find that there is a critical market default rate below which the
firm benefits from offering layaway and above which the firm is better off not offering layaway. We
investigate how this critical default rate changes with other problem parameters. Finally, through
a stylized two-period model, we also investigate the influence of the timing of layaway defaults.
The presented work is a much needed first step in studying the operational implications of
layaway programs. Given the prevalence of layaway in retail, retailers can benefit from further
studies. One example is the fact that customers may put a down payment that is greater than
r
L
, as currently assumed in our model. Another is to relax the assumption that a consumer’s
valuation and budget are independently distributed. This assumption may not necessarily hold
true in practice, it is not inconceivable to think that budget and valuation may be correlated
(either positively or negatively). If budgets are negatively correlated with valuations, then the need
for layaway and thus the benefit may increase as more customers may participate in a layaway
program. Another possible extension would be the consideration of a more general multi-period
model. In the presented work we largely focus on a compressed single period model. Though we also
briefly study a two period model that considers different times of default and time of purchases,
extending the model to more general multiple period settings will be of interest. These are just
some of the potential extensions to the work presented here, we look forward to seeing layaway
further explored in the operations management literature.
Appendix
A. Notation
Q order quantity
F (·) the distribution of demand, assumed to be invertible
D the demand for the product
v valuation of the good v∼U [0,2v¯]
b budget of the consumer b∼U [0,2b¯]
pI Probability of an instant purchase: pI ≡
(
1− r
2b¯
) (
1− r
2v¯
)
pL Probability of a layaway purchase:
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pL ≡
(
1− r+fs
2v¯θ
) (
Lr−r
2Lb¯
)
≡ (1− r+fs
2v¯θ
) (
r
2b¯
) (
L−1
L
)
r The retail price of the good
L is the length of the layaway period, usually 8 or 12 weeks. The unit of measure here is weeks
θ is the disutility of waiting to receive the good that is put on layaway
δ is the default rate
fs is the service fee for entering into a layaway contract
fc is the cancellation fee for cancelling a layaway contract
s is the salvage cost/holdover value of a single item (may be negative or positive: positive means
holding cost, while negative means salvage value)
u is the shortage cost for a single unit of demand
c is the purchase cost for a single item
B. Proofs
In this section we present the details of the derivations of our results.
Proof of Proposition 1
piL(Q) = Ef(·)pˆiL(Q,D)
=
∫ Q/(pI+pL)
0
[(pI · r+ pL · (δ(fs + fc) + (1− δ)(fs + r)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
r′
·x
− s(Q− (pI + pL)x+ pLδx)]f(x)dx
+
∫ ∞
Q/(pI+pL)
[(
pI
pI + pL
· r+ pL
pI + pL
· (δ(fs + fc) + (1− δ)(fs + r))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
r′′
Q
− pL
pL+pI
δQs− u((pI + pL)x−Q)
]
f(x)dx
−cQ
=
∫ Q/(pI+pL)
0
[r′x− s(Q− (pI + pL)x+ pLδx)]f(x)dx
+
∫ ∞
Q/(pI+pL)
[r′′Q− pL
pL + pI
δQs− u((pI + pL)x−Q)]f(x)dx− cQ
Now compute the derivative of piL(Q)
Dimitrov, Ceryan: Optimal Inventory Decisions when Offering Layaway
18 ;
dpiL(Q)
dQ
=
1
pI + pL
[
r′
Q
pI + pL
− s(Q− pI + pL
pI + pL
Q+ pLδ
Q
pI + pL
)
]
f
(
Q
pI + pL
)
+
∫ Q/(pI+pL)
0
−sf(x)dx
− 1
pI+pL
[
r′′Q− pL
pL + pI
δQs− u
(
(pI + pL)
Q
pI + pL
−Q
)]
f
(
Q
pI + pL
)
+
∫ ∞
Q/(pI+pL)
[r′′− pL
pL + pI
δs+ u]f(x)dx− c
= 1
pI+pL
[
r′ Q
pI+pL
− spLδ QpI+pL
]
f( Q
pI+pL
)− sF ( Q
pI+pL
)
− 1
pI+pL
[
r′′Q− pL
pI+pL
δQs
]
f( Q
pI+pL
) + [r′′− pL
pI+pL
δs+ u](1−F ( Q
pI+pL
))− c
= [r′′− pL
pI+pL
δs+ u](1−F ( Q
pI+pL
))− sF ( Q
pI+pL
)− c Note: r′′ = r′
(pI+pL)
We can look at the SOCs for piL(Q) with respect to Q:
d2piL(Q)
dQ2
= − 1
pI+pL
[r′′− pL
pI+pL
δs+ u]f( Q
pI+pL
)− s
pI+pL
f( Q
pI+pL
)
= − 1
pI+pL
[r′′− pL
pI+pL
δs+ u+ s]f( Q
pI+pL
)
r′′− pL
pI+pL
δs+ u+ s≥ 0 as pL
pI+pL
δs≤ s and r′′ ≥ 0. This means that the second order derivative is
negative.
We now solve the FOCs of piL(Q) for Q to determine Q
∗
L.
0 = [r′′− pL
pI+pL
δs+ u](1−F ( Q∗L
pI+pL
))− sF ( Q∗L
pI+pL
)− c
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u−c
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u+s
= F (
Q∗L
pI+pL
))
Q∗L = (pI + pL)F
−1
(
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u−c
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u+s
)

Proof of Proposition 2
We start with rewriting Q∗L = (pI + pL)F
−1
(
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u−c
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u+s
)
. We note that for the variables we
consider: fc, δ,u, s, and c, (pI + pL) does not change with their value, in addition, pI + pL is always
non-negative. We also note that F−1(x) is a positive monotonically increasing function in x, by
definition of a inverse cumulative distribution function. Therefore, to determine how Q∗L changes
with respect to the variables of interest, we just have determine how
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u−c
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u+s
changes with
respect to each variable. If we define CF =
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u−c
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u+s
, then sign
(
∂Q∗L
∂i
)
= sign
(
∂CF
∂i
)
, for i ∈
{fc, δ,u, s, c}. We omit the calculation of the partials of CF in the interest of space.

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Proof of Proposition 3
We first show that for any given Q, the expected profit decreases in the default rate δ. Differentiating
the expected profit expression given in (2) with respect to δ, we get:
dpi(Q)
dδ
= pL(fc− r− s)
∫ Q/(PI+PL)
0
xf(x)dx+
Q
PI +PL
pL(fc− r− s)
(
1−F ( Q
PI +PL
)
)
< 0
where the inequality follows from the assumption that fc−r−s< 0. Let piδ(Q) and piδ′(Q) be the
expected profit function based on a quantity selection of Q, corresponding to a default rate of δ and
δ′, respectively. Therefore, for any given δ′ > δ, and for any particular Q, we have piδ(Q)>piδ′(Q).
Next, let Q∗(δ) and Q∗(δ′) be the optimal quantity selection corresponding to a default rate of δ
and δ′, respectively. Then,
piδ(Q
∗(δ))≥ piδ(Q∗(δ′))>piδ′(Q∗(δ′))
where the first inequality is due to the definition of optimality and the second inequality follows
from our previous result that the expected profit decreases with respect to the default rate for any
particular Q.

Proof of Proposition 4
We first define the profit function of the retailer when no layaway is offered, using the notation
introduced in Section 3. Letting pˆiNL(Q,D) denote the profit for the retailer for a particular quantity
selection Q, we write:
pˆiNL(Q,D) =
 pI · r ·D− (Q− pI ·D) · s− cQ if pI ·D≤Qr ·Q− (pI ·D−Q) · u− cQ if pI ·D>Q (5)
Next, let piNL(Q) :=ED(pˆiNL(Q,D)) denote the expected profit of the retailer when not offering
layaway and ordering Q units. We have:
piNL(Q) = r
(∫ Q/pI
0
pIxf(x)dx+
∫ ∞
Q/pI
Qf(x)dx
)
−s
∫ Q/pI
0
(Q− pIx)f(x)dx− u
∫ ∞
Q/pI
(pIx−Q)f(x)dx− cQ
Differentiating piNL(Q) with respect to Q, yields
dpiNL(Q)
dQ
= (pI · r+ u)
(
1−F
(
Q
pI
))
− sF
(
Q
pI
)
− c.
It can be simply verified that the second order derivative d
2piNL(Q)
dQ2
= −(pI · r + u + s)F
(
Q
pI
)
is
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concave whenever the salvage value for the product does not exceed the shortage penalty, i.e.,
−s < u. The optimal order quantity for the no-layaway case, denoted by Q∗NL is then given by:
Q∗NL = (pI)F
−1
(
pI ·r+u−c
pI ·r+u+s
)
. Finally, we let pi∗NL(Q
∗) denote the optimal expected profit under the
no-layaway case.
Note that the expected optimal profit function for the no-layaway instance pi∗NL(Q
∗) does not
depend on δ as the firm does not serve the layaway market and thus is not exposed to the default
rate in this instance. We also recall that the expected profit function for the layaway instance,
pi∗L(Q
∗(δ)) strictly decreases with the default rate δ as stated in Proposition 3. Therefore, pi∗L(Q
∗(δ))
will equal pi∗NL(Q
∗) at most once.
Consider now the comparison between pi∗L(Q
∗(δ)) and pi∗NL(Q
∗), i.e., the expected profit under
the layaway (for any given δc) and the no-layaway instances. Let δc denote a critical default rate
that would cause the firm to be indifferent between offering and not offering layaways. Let δc ≡ 1 if
pi∗L(Q
∗(δ))>pi∗NL(Q
∗) for all δ ∈ [0,1]. Similarly, let δc ≡ 0 if pi∗L(Q∗(δ))<pi∗NL(Q∗) for all δ ∈ [0,1].
Otherwise, δc is such that pi
∗
L(Q
∗(δc)) = pi∗NL(Q
∗). Hence, it is optimal for the firm to offer layaways
if the market default rate δ ∈ [0,1) satisfies δ < δc and do not offer layaways if otherwise, i.e., δ≥ δc.

C. Computing Sensitivity Analysis of Q∗L
In this section we present the method we used to compute the sensitivity analysis of the optimal
order quantity when layaway is offered for b¯, fs, v¯, θ, L, and r. We note that the following holds
from the chain rule:
d
dy
g1(y)F
−1(g2(y)) = g1(y)
1
F ′(F−1(g2(y)))
g′2(y) + g
′
1(y)F
−1(g2(y)) (6)
As we see in (6), it is no longer sufficient to consider g′2(y) as even if g
′
2(y) were negative in the
relationship between the two terms in the sum that dictate if g1(y)F
−1(g2(y)) is increasing or
not. Note that in our case g1(y) = (pI + pL) and g2(y) =
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u−c
r′′− pLpI+pL δs+u+s
. For a general distribution
function, it is difficult to determine how Q∗L changes with each of the variables of interest. Therefore,
to explore the relationship between Q∗L and the variables of interest, we consider demand that is
distributed uniformly on [0,K]. For a given demand distribution, we use F−1(·) and vary only one
parameter, holding all other parameters constant in equation (3). We generate multiple plots, but
in the interest of space we only qualitatively describe the plots in this section.
We present the relationship we found in our numerical exploration of the value of Q∗L with
changes in fs, r, b¯, v¯, c, δ, and θ as depicted in Table 3. What we see in Table 3 is that for both
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Variable Q∗L (under Uniform Demand) Q
∗
L (under Lognormal Demand)
fs ↑ then ↓ ↓
r ↑ then ↓ ↑ then ↓
b¯ ↑ ↑
v¯ ↑ ↑
c ↓ ↓
L ↑ ↑
θ ↑ ↑
Table 3 Additional Comparative Statics on the Optimal Order Quantity in the Presence of Layaways.
uniform and lognormal demand distributions, the relationship between the optimal order quantity,
Q∗L and the parameters we consider is qualitatively the same for both of the distributions. The
one difference is the relationship between fs and Q
∗
L. When we consider uniform demand, we have
an initially increasing value of Q∗L and then a decreasing value of Q
∗
L (the relationship looks like
an inverted ‘U’); for lognormal demand, we notice that Q∗L is decreasing, the right-hand side of
an inverted ‘U.’ This we think is an artifact of the distribution and may mean the demand for
layaway products is highly sensitive to the service fee for the lognormal demand distribution. In
the uniform demand setting, the inverted ‘U’ is observed because on the one hand the retailer
would like to collect more layaway program fees from consumers, thus more items are ordered; on
the other hand, as the service fee increases the likelihood of someone participating in the layaway
program decreases, pL =
(
1− r+fs
2v¯θ
) (
r
2b¯
) (
L−1
L
)
, thus the need for additional products decreases. As
we see initially the desire for increased revenue from layaway purchasers is the dominating effect,
but as fs increases the latter, likelihood of participation decreasing ends up being the dominating
effect. The optimal order quantity is increasing with b¯ and v¯. As b¯ increases, a larger fraction of
consumers can purchase the good. Similarly, as v¯ increases, a larger fraction of consumers will be
willing to purchase the good, potentially via layaway for a fixed price. The last relationship we
would like to highlight is the relationship between the optimal order quantity and θ, the waiting
discount. In our exploration, we first notice that the optimal order quantity does not change for
low values of θ, but then increases as θ increases. The reason follows from the choice model we
consider in which a consumer will purchase if θv > r+ fs. Specifically, θ must be sufficiently large
for any customer to purchase.
D. Formulation for the Two-Period Model
Below, we provide the expected profit function, denoted by pi2(Q) for the two-period layaway model
as presented in Section 6. The formulation corresponds to instances in which pIα≥ pLδβ, i.e., the
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firm will never run out of products in period 1 yet fully meet demand in period 2 due to defaulted
units at the end of the first period (for details, please see the description in Section 6).
pi2(Q) =
∫ Q/(pI+(1−δβ)pL)
0
[
(pI · r+ pL · (fs + δfc + (1− δ)r)) ·x
− s(Q− (pI + pL)x+ pLδx)
]
f(x)dx
+
∫ Q/((1−α)pI+pL)
Q/(pI+(1−δβ)pL)
[
((1−α) · pI · r+ pL · (fs + δfc + (1− δ)r)) ·x
r ·
(
Q− ((1−α)pI + pL) ·x+ δβpLx
)
− u
(
αpIx−Q+ ((1−α)pI + pL)x− δβpLx
)
− spL(1− δβ)x
]
f(x)dx
+
∫ ∞
Q/((1−α)pI+pL)
[(
(1−α)pI
(1−α)pI + pL · r+
pL
(1−α)pI + pL · (fs + δfc + (1− δ)r)
)
Q
+
pL
(1−α)pI + pL δβQr
− u
(
(pI + pL)x−Q− pLδβ
(1−α)pI + pLQ
)
− s
(
pLδ(1−β)
(1−α)pI + pLQ
)]
f(x)dx
−c Q
The first integral in the expression of the expected profit function for the two-period model
corresponds to demand realizations that allows the firm to satisfy all incoming demand in both
periods. Specifically, the term (pI · r+ pL · (fs + δfc + (1− δ)r)) ·x corresponds to the revenue gen-
erated across both periods through immediate purchases, and through the service fee, cancellation
fee, and full sales revenues generated by layaways. The term s(Q− (pI + pL)x+ pLδx) is the cost
associated with salvaging left over inventory; salvage is costly if s > 0 and the firm can capture
some revenue from salvages if s< 0. (As a side note, we do not apply discounting on the second
period in order to aid in the exposition of the model and highlight the main drivers of the ordering
quantity, however, a discount factor can be implemented.)
The second integral corresponds to demand realizations that allows the firm to satisfy all incom-
ing first period demand, but only partially satisfy the second period demand based on the number
of units available at the end of period 1 (i.e., units left over after satisfying first period demand
plus units that become available for period 2 due to some layaway defaults in period 1). Specif-
ically, the term ((1−α) · pI · r+ pL · (fs + δfc + (1− δ)r)) · x refers to revenues due to immediate
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purchases in the first period and the layaway sales. We remind the reader that we assume all lay-
away customers arrive in the first period. The second term, r ·
(
Q− ((1−α)pI + pL) · x+ δβplx
)
,
corresponds to revenue from immediate purchases that were only partially satisfied as permitted
by the available inventory. The inventory consists of all unsold units at the end of period 1, i.e.,
Q− ((1−α)pI + pL) ·x, and the units that become available for period 2 due to defaults in period
1, δβpLx. The term u
(
αpIx−Q+ ((1−α)pI + pL)x− δβpLx
)
captures the costs associated with
missed immediate sales in period 2, and the term spL(1− δβ)x refers to the salvage cost associated
with the items that were defaulted in period 2.
Lastly, the third integral corresponds to demand instances where the firm is unable to meet
demand in either of the periods. The term
(
(1−α)pI
(1−α)pI+pL · r+
pL
(1−α)pI+pL · (fs + δfc + (1− δ)r)
)
Q
refers to revenues associated with first period immediate purchases and the layaway customers (we
assume the products are distributed in a first come first serve fashion). The term pL
(1−α)pI+pL δβQr
represents the revenues associated with second period sales for immediate purchase customers. In
the remaining terms, u
(
(pI + pL)x−Q− pLδβ(1−α)pI+pLQ
)
and s
(
pLδ(1−β)
(1−α)pI+pLQ
)
, correspond to missed
sales and salvage costs, respectively and c Q is the cost of ordering Q units at the beginning of the
first period.
E. Market segment size with model parameters
The market size for immediate and layaway purchases is captured by pI and pL. We now consider
how these segments change with different model parameters.
Variable pI pL pI/pL
r ↓ ↑ then ↓ ↓ then ↑
fs ↔ ↓ ↑
b¯ ↑ ↓ ↑
v¯ ↑ ↑ ↓
L ↔ ↑ ↓
θ ↔ ↑ ↓
Table 4 Change in probability of purchase, layaway or immediate, with model parameters. (↑ means weakly
increasing, ↓ means weakly decreasing, and ↔ means constant)
From Table 4 we see that pI and pL change with different model parameters. We find that
depending on value of r, initially more consumers will purchase via layaway, but then this trend
will reverse and more will purchase immediately. We also find that the behavior of pI and pL with
respect to b¯ and v¯ is not symmetric. This is not surprising given the definition of pL in which the
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signs of the b¯ and v¯ terms are different. A retailer may use the findings in Table 4 to inform itself
of what the makeup of its consumers will be as model parameters change.
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